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Abstract 
Building  on  three  widely  accepted  premises  (productivity  gains  from  the  division  of 
labor, efficiency gains derived from the proximity of suppliers and users of certain inputs, 
the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market) this paper shows that a  small, 
open economy may be caught in an underdevelopment trap in which a shallow division of 
labor  (i.e.,  a  low  variety  of  specialized  inputs)  is  self-reinforcing.  In  turn,  the  shallow 
division of labor leads to a relatively low rate of return to capital, so foreign investment or 
domestic capital accumulation may not materialize. 
JEL classification:  011 ; F21 ; L 16 
Keywords:  Returns  from the division  of labor; Non-tradable  intermediate  goods;  Decreasing  average 
costs; Multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria 
1. Introduction 
The neoclassical growth model implies that  automatic  mechanisms  will take an 
underdeveloped economy out of poverty.  According to this model,  an economy  is 
poor because  of a  lack of capital.  This implies that  in  poor economies the rate  of 
return  to  capital  is  high,  generating  strong  incentives  for  foreign  investment  and 
* Corresponding  author. 1101 East 58th  St., Chicago,  IL 60637. Phone: (312)  702-88. fax:  (312) 
702-0458 e-mail: andres.rodriguez@gsb.uchicago.edu. 
0304-3878/96/$15.00  ©  1996 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved 
SSDI 0304-3878(95)0005  1-8 4  A. Rodrlguez-Clare/Journal of Development Economics 49 (1996) 3-32 
domestic  capital  accumulation.  1 Yet,  a  casual  look  at  the  experience  of many 
underdeveloped economies  since  World  War II calls  into  doubt  these  automatic 
mechanisms: in many poor economies per capita income has remained stagnant for 
decades and both foreign and domestic investment have been relatively low as a 
percentage of total production.  A  more systematic look at the data also reveals a 
lack of convergence across all countries (Barro,  1991). 
There  have been  several  attempts to  explain  this  lack of convergence across 
countries:  some  authors  have  introduced  human  capital  into  the  neoclassical 
growth  model  to  reconcile  the  model  with  the  stylized  facts (e.g.,  Barro  et  al., 
1995),  while  others  have  focused  on  externalities  (e.g.,  Lucas,  1990)  and  yet 
others  have  stressed  differences  in  economic policy  (e.g.,  Parente  and  Prescott, 
1994;  Sachs  and Warner,  1995).  This paper considers  another possible explana- 
tion: it builds a model to show how an economy with a low division of labor may 
be stuck in an underdevelopment trap, where  both  wages and the rate of return to 
capital are low  so that there  may be no incentives for foreign investment or for 
domestic capital accumulation. 
The  argument  presented  in  this  paper  is  based  on  three  widely  accepted 
premises. The first, which dates back to Adam Smith, is that the wealth of nations 
is partially explained by the division of labor or, in other words, by the production 
of goods  and  the  use  of techniques  that  rely  intensively  on  a  wide  variety  of 
specialized  intermediate  goods  and  services.  Today  this  is  as  clear  as  ever:  in 
developed economies  most firms  use  roundabout  production  methods,  in  which 
many different specialized inputs are used to produce final goods. In recent years, 
this  old  piece  of wisdom  has  regained  center  stage  in  many  fields;  this  paper 
follows this trend.  2 
It  is  evident  that  some  economies  have  not  reaped  the  benefits  that  can  be 
derived from the division of labor. In these economies few resources are allocated 
to produce specialized inputs, and most firms produce goods or use techniques that 
rely intensively on direct or  'raw' labor. A  natural  question arises:  why is it that 
poor  economies  do  not  import  the  specialized  inputs  produced  in  developed 
economies  to  benefit  from  the  division  of  labor  existing  there?  One  possible 
explanation,  which  constitutes  the  second  premise  of our  argument,  is  that  for 
many inputs it is important that the supplier be near the final producer. 
Producer services (e.g. banking, auditing, consulting, wholesale services, trans- 
portation, machine repair), which are usually regarded as  non-tradable  goods, are 
See Lucas (1990), Romer (1991) and Stiglitz (1988). 
2 The idea that efficiency is enhanced by the division of labor was introduced by Adam Smith and 
revived this century by Young (1928) and Stigler (1951). This idea has been recently formalized and 
used  in  Growth  Theory  by  Romer  (1990)  and  in  International  Economics  by  Ethier  (1982a) and 
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a  clear example of such inputs. 3 But even acquiring physical intermediate goods 
not produced  locally may be quite costly.  Given that  many producer  services  are 
involved in taking those goods from the point of production to where they will be 
used, if these services are lacking or costly, using imported physical inputs may be 
costly. Moreover, when inputs have to be imported, there is a  higher risk that they 
will not arrive at the right time or with the correct specifications, forcing firms to 
hold  high  inventories  of  such  inputs. 4  As  Porter  (1992)  argues,  the  domestic 
presence of suppliers is an important determinant of the comparative advantage of 
nations  because  it  provides  "efficient,  early,  rapid,  and  sometimes  preferential 
access to the most cost-effective inputs"  (p.  102).  5 
Our  first  two  premises  imply  that  the  local  production  of  a  wide  variety  of 
specialized inputs improves the efficiency of local firms producing final goods,  an 
idea  that  dates  back  at  least  to  the  work  of  Marshall  (1920),  and  has  been 
reexamined  more  recently  by  Jacobs  (1969),  Jacobs  (1984),  Porter  (1992), 
Rivera-Batiz (1988) and Fujita (1989), among others (see Holmes (1995) for some 
recent  evidence  in  support  of  this  hypothesis).  But  if  this  is  to  provide  an 
explanation  for  the  difference  in  economic  performance  across  rich  and  poor 
countries, we must first explain why poor economies themselves do not produce a 
wide variety of specialized intermediate goods. 
This paper  will show that  if specialized intermediate goods  are produced  with 
decreasing average costs, there may be an equilibrium in which few of such goods 
are  produced  (i.e.,  an  equilibrium with  a  shallow  division of  labor). 6  The  low 
variety  of  specialized  inputs  leads  to  the  production  of  goods  and  the  use  of 
3  The seminal contribution on the role of producer services in a modern economy is Greenfield 
(1966), who viewed producer services as intangible inputs whose production cannot be separated in 
time or place from their use, and therefore regarded them as nontradable goods. More recently, one can 
find this view in empirical studies on real exchange rates of national price levels, which usually treat 
services as nontradable goods (see Kravis and Lipsey, 1988). It may be argued that there actually is 
trade in services but such trade is better conceived as the result of foreign investment rather than pure 
trade (see Hindley, 1990; Kravis, 1985). As will become clear below, this distinction is important in the 
context of this paper. Rodrlguez-Clare (1993) reviews the empirical literature on the importance of the 
location of producer services for the location of industry (see also Daniels (1985)). 
4  See  Greif and  Rodrlguez-Clare  (1995)  and  Wilson  (1992,  pp.  101  104), for  some concrete 
examples. 
5 in regional economics, the conventional wisdom seems to be that when the value/weight ratio is 
low, when the time of need of inputs is uncertain, when low quantities are needed and quality and time 
of delivery are essential, then it is very convenient to have the source of the input close by (see Vernon, 
1966; Scott and Storper, 1987). 
6  There  is evidence  that  many intermediate goods  are produced with decreasing average costs, 
particularly for producer services. Faini (1984) mentions various studies which support the assumption 
that increasing returns to scale prevail in the production of producer services (banking, accounting, 
transportation, electricity,...). Moreover, professional services (consulting, auditing, engineering  .... ) 
are intensive in information as an input of production (see Romer, 1991). 6  A. Rodrfguez-Clare/Journal of Development Economics  49 (1996) 3-32 
techniques that do not require a wide variety of these inputs. This in turn limits the 
size  of the  market  for  specialized  inputs  and  the  incentives  to  undertake  their 
production. This is just a reflection of another old idea, which constitutes the third 
premise of our argument, namely, that the division of labor is limited by the extent 
of the  market.  A  similar  logic  establishes  that  there  may  be  an  equilibrium  in 
which a large variety of intermediate goods are produced (i.e.,  an equilibrium with 
a deep division of labor). Therefore, there is the possibility of multiple equilibria. 
When there are multiple equilibria and the returns from the division of labor are 
sufficiently high, both the wage and the rate of return to capital  are higher in the 
equilibrium  with  a  deep division  of labor than  in the equilibrium  with  a  shallow 
division  of labor.  In  this  case,  the  equilibrium  with  a  deep  division  of labor  is 
Pareto-superior to the equilibrium  with  a  shallow division  of labor.  Furthermore, 
as  long  as  there  are  positive  returns  from  the  division  of  labor,  the  former 
equilibrium  dominates the latter according to the potential-Pareto criterion;  in the 
context of a small, open economy, this just implies that production valued at world 
prices is higher in the equilibrium  with a deep division of labor. 7 
The  situation  of  an  economy  in  the  'bad'  equilibrium  could  be  improved 
through an increase  in the capital  stock.  Intuitively,  a  higher capital  stock would 
expand the market and allow a deeper division of labor, which would allow some 
firms to produce goods and use techniques that rely intensively on a wide variety 
of specialized inputs. In turn, this would make the production of specialized inputs 
more profitable, thereby deepening the division of labor in the intermediate  goods 
sector  even  more.  This  virtuous  circle  could  take  the  economy  out  of the  bad 
equilibrium.  In  formal  terms,  a  sufficiently  high  capital  stock  rules  out  the 
existence of an equilibrium  with a  shallow division of labor. 
The problem is that the rate of return  to capital in a  poor economy is low, for 
exactly the  same reasons  that the economy is  poor; namely, because the  shallow 
division  of  labor  renders  primary  factors  less  productive.  As  a  consequence, 
capital  does  not  necessarily  flow  from  abroad.  Formally,  the  paper  shows  that 
there  exists  an allocation of capital  across economies such that the capital-labor 
ratio and the wage rate are higher in rich economies than in poor ones and yet, in 
contrast to the neoclassical growth model, there is equalization in the rate of return 
to  capital.  In  the  working  paper  version  of this  paper  I  show  that,  for  similar 
7 One empirical implication of the model, taking producer services as main class of non-tradable 
inputs produced with decreasing average costs, is that countries with higher income per capita should 
have a higher proportion of the labor force devoted to the production of producer services. Singlemann 
(1970) provides empirical support for this prediction: "among countries, the higher the level of per 
capita income, the larger the proportion of the labor force in producer and social services" (p. 94). 
More recent data for a subset of producer services, business services, also verifies this prediction (see 
Rodr~guez-Clare, 1993). Kubo et al. (1986) provide additional evidence that development is associated 
with a deepening division of labor. A. Rodrfguez-Clare / Journal of Development Economics 49 (1996) 3-32  7 
reasons, domestic capital accumulation does not necessarily take the economy out 
of the bad equilibrium. 8 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section relates the main 
results of this paper to the previous literature.  Section 3 presents the basic model 
and  Section  4  characterizes  its  equilibria,  showing  the  conditions  under  which 
there  are  multiple  equilibria.  Section  5  focuses  on  the  case  in  which  there  are 
multiple  equilibria  and  shows  that  the  equilibria  are  Pareto-rankable.  Section  6 
shows  that the  model  is  consistent  with  the  absence of large capital flows from 
rich to poor countries.  That section also discusses informally the implications of 
extending the model to allow for capital accumulation. 
2. Relation to previous literature 
As is well known in the international-trade literature, multiple Pareto-rankable 
equilibria may arise in a model of a small, open economy where there are positive 
technological externalities in one sector. When more resources are devoted to the 
production  of  the  good  that  has  externalities,  production  costs  for  this  good 
decrease; this complementarity leads to the possibility of multiple Pareto-rankable 
equilibria.  Since its original formulation by Graham (1923),  this  model has been 
criticized because of the  vague nature  of the external economies considered (see 
Scitovsky,  1954). 
In  their  formalization of Rosenstein-Rodan's Big  Push  theory,  Murphy  et al. 
(1989)  show  that even with  no technological  externalities there may be multiple 
Pareto-rankable equilibria. 9 In their model the economy is closed to international 
trade and there are many different sectors which can use a simple constant-returns 
technology or an increasing returns  technology (called an industrial  technology). 
Complementarities may arise because as one sector adopts the industrial  technol- 
ogy it may increase demand for the  goods of other sectors.  This  would  make it 
more  likely  that  other  sectors  adopt  the  industrial  technology,  leading  to  the 
possibility  of multiple  Pareto-rankable equilibria.  In  essence,  this  theory  asserts 
Specifically,  in Rodr~guez-Clare  (1995b) I construct a dynamic version of the model  presented in 
this paper to show that when the  economy inherits a low capital  stock,  there are  two paths of capital 
accumulation:  one which leads to a low steady  state capital  stock with a shallow division of labor and a 
low rate  of return to  capital,  and  another path  in  which the  capital  stock increases beyond the  low 
steady  state,  leading  to  a  deeper  division  of labor and  to  the  production  of goods and  the  use  of 
techniques that use more roundabout methods of production. 
9  There are also models in macroeconomics in which there are  multiple Pareto-rankable  equilibria 
owing to the existence of increasing returns to scale.  See for instance Cooper and John (1988).  Stiglitz 
(1991)  contains several suggestions of feedback mechanisms that may generate multiple equilibria  and 
discusses the  importance of this approach for development economics. 8  A. Rodrfguez-Clare/Journal of Development Economics 49 (1996) 3-32 
that in the low-development equilibrium there is no industrialization because of a 
lack of domestic demand. 
This paper presents an altemative approach. It is assumed that the economy is 
open to international trade in final goods. The domestic market does play a critical 
role here, but because of the importance of domestic inputs  in the production of 
final goods. The obstacle to development arises from the shallow division of labor 
in the intermediate goods sector rather than from the constraint imposed by low 
domestic demand.  This  difference between this  model  and  the  Big Push  model 
leads to very different policy implications: in this model it is the creation of the 
appropriate  linkages  and  not  a  policy of  'balanced  growth'  that  should  be  the 
major concern of underdeveloped countries. 10 In this sense, this paper is closer to 
the literature that developed from the seminal contribution of Hirschman (1958), 
who emphasized the importance of forward and backward linkages in the process 
of economic development. 
A related model has been proposed by Okuno-Fujiwara (1988), who shows that 
the  presence  of  a  non-tradable  intermediate  good  produced  with  decreasing 
average  costs  may  lead  to  multiple  Pareto-rankable equilibria in  a  small,  open 
economy. Okuno-Fujiwara was  concerned with the obstacles to the development 
of a particular sector of the economy and to study this he developed a model of 
interdependence of two  industries:  a  final-good industry and  a  non-traded input 
industry. In contrast, the emphasis of this paper is on the problems of development 
for a whole economy. Accordingly, we emphasize the importance of the division 
of labor (i.e.  the  variety of non-tradable  intermediate goods) and  its  effects on 
wages and the rate of return to capital.  ~ 
Also related are papers by Ciccone and Matsuyama (in this issue) and Rodrik 
(1995).  Ciccone and  Matsuyama  show  the  existence of multiple  equilibria in  a 
dynamic model that exhibits complementarities that  are related to the  ones that 
arise  in  this  paper.  The  complementarities  in  their  model  arise  because  of  a 
relatively high aggregate elasticity of substitution between labor and intermediate 
goods, whereas in this paper complementarities arise because of the expansion of 
the  sector  that  uses  intermediate  goods  intensively.  Rodrik  (1995)  shows  the 
existence of multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria in a  model that is  similar to the 
one  presented  here.  Rodrik's  objectives  are  different,  however,  in  that  he  is 
interested primarily in  understanding  how  the  education level  of the  workforce 
10  Indeed, this seems to have been one of the main comers in the industrial  policy of the South-East 
export-oriented economies. Wade (1990) makes this argument for the particular case of Taiwan. 
ll  A similar model is the one developed by Murphy et al. (1989) in section IV of their paper. In this 
section  they  explore the  interdependence  between investment in  infrastructure and  industrialization. 
Since infrastructure is clearly  non-tradable, this model comes closer to the model by Okuno-Fujiwara 
and to the model developed in this paper. A. Rodriguez-Clare / Journal of Development Economics 49 (1996) 3-32  9 
determines whether there are multiple equilibria, and on how  a  high-wage policy 
may help the economy select the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. 
3. The basic model 
There are two final goods,  z  and  y, and one intermediate good  x, which comes 
in a continuum of varieties. Variety is indexed by the real number j. Since we will 
assume  below that  all varieties of  x  are identical, without  loss of generality we 
can  represent  the  set  of varieties  available by  the  interval  [0, n],  where  n  is  a 
positive real number. The primary inputs are labor and capital, whose total supply 
is fixed at quantities  L  and  K  respectively. 
Goods  z  and  y  can  be  traded freely in  the  world  market,  and  the  domestic 
economy is  'small' in the sense that it does not affect the international prices of  z 
and  y,  denoted  respectively  by  Pz  and  Py  (in  terms  of  some  international 
numeraire).  To  capture  in  a  simple  way  the  importance  of  proximity  between 
suppliers and users of inputs, we will assume that all varieties of  x  are non-trada- 
ble.  ~2  We will let p(j)  denote the price of variety j  of intermediate good  x. 
Intermediate  good  x  is  produced  with  a  simple  decreasing  average  cost 
technology: there is a  fixed requirement of 1 unit of capital and each unit of x(j) 
requires one unit of labor:  x(j)  = Lx(j),  where  Lx(j) is the quantity of labor used 
in  the  production  of  x(j).  This  specification of the  technology is  introduced  to 
capture in a  simple way the idea that the division of labor is limited by the extent 
of the market. 
Both final goods are produced with a Cobb-Douglas production function using 
capital, labor and  a  composite intermediate good,  H,  which  in turn  is assembled 
from a  continuum of differentiated intermediate goods: 
O~ = K~(SlL~ ('~)- ~(~')H~!  -/3(.~),  (la) 
H,, = ( f(o"x(j),:dj)  l/~ ,  (lb) 
where  /3(s) and  6(s)  are parameters in [0, 1],  with  /3(s) >  6(s),  for  s =  z,y  and 
ce ~  (0, 1).  13  It is assumed that  /3(z) >/3(y)  and  ¢5(z) <  6(y), which implies that 
t2  The reader should keep in mind that the assumption of non-tradability is made to simplify the 
analysis; less extreme assumptions would lead to the same results. As long as transport costs for 
intermediate goods are significant, finns prefer to set up in countries that produce these inputs so as to 
save on  those  transportation costs. Non-tradability is  an  extreme assumption that considerably 
simplifies the analysis but milder assumptions suffice for the results of the model. 
.3  The composite intermediate good  H  uses the functional form introduced by Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1978) first proposed as a specification for a utility function and later applied to production theory by 
Ethier (1982a). 10  A. Rodrfguez-Clare / Journal of Development  Economics 49 (1996) 3-32 
the  y-industry  uses  intermediate  goods  and  capital  more  intensively  than  the 
z-industry.  14  15  16 
The specification of the production function in (1) implies that there are returns 
from the division of labor in the production  of intermediate goods. Because of the 
symmetric  way  in  which  different  varieties  of  x  enter  in  (1)  and  convexity 
(0 <  a  <  1),  efficiency  requires  firms  producing  final  goods  to  use  the  same 
quantity  of all  available  varieties.  Letting  X  =  f~x(j)dj  =  nx  be  the  amount  of 
labor devoted to the production  of intermediate goods,  the production function for 
s  can be written  as 
Q~ =  n6~S)K~s ~)L fl~s)- a~*)X~- ~)  (2) 
where  ~b(s)= (1  -fl(s))(1  -a)/a,  s  =  z,y.  Eq.  (2)  clearly  shows  that  an  in- 
crease  in  the  measure  of varieties  available  increases  total  factor  productivity  in 
the  production  of final  goods  -  the  same  quantities  of  K,  L  and  X  produce  a 
higher quantity  of the final good when  n  increases.  This arises because inputs  are 
imperfect  substitutes  amongst  themselves  (a  <  1).  Therefore,  the  fewer  varieties 
available  in  the  marketplace,  the  more  intensively  the  firm  will  have  to  use  the 
available intermediate goods to substitute for the  'missing' inputs and the more the 
firm  will  'lose'  in  imperfect  substitution.  17  This  property  of  the  production 
function  in  (1)  is  commonly  referred  to  as  love  of  variety for  inputs  and  is 
introduced  in  this  model  to  capture  the  existence  of returns  from the  division of 
labor. 
14  An alternative interpretation of the model is that there are two methods of production (rather than 
two goods), which differ in the intensity with which they use specialized inputs; in this case we would 
have  Pz = Py. 
15  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1991)  in  chapter  6 present  a  similar  model (although  with  different 
aims), but with  /3(z)= fl(y). Because of this there is a unique equilibrium. Markusen (1990) presents 
a model that comes closer to our model. In fact his model can be seen as a particular case of our model 
with  6(z) = 6(y) = 0 and  fl(z) = 1. We will comment further on the relation between our paper and 
Markusen's  below. Helpman and Krugman (1985) show that the existence of non-tradable intermediate 
goods may lead to multiple equilibria in model of two-country trade. The multiple equilibria result they 
obtain  concerns  only the way in  which  the  integrated  equilibrium  is reproduced  in the two  country 
model, and hence does not have any welfare implications. 
16  The results do not change significantly when  6(z)> 6(y); see footnote 21. 
17  One alternative modelling strategy would be to assume that each firm producing a final good will 
need different inputs at different times. At any time, a given firm wants an ideal specialized input; if it 
is not available in the market, the firm will buy the 'closest' one it finds and transform it, at a cost, into 
the desired input. The more varieties available of the input, the less the firm will have to incur into this 
transformation cost and hence the more efficient the firm will be. This alternative model is based on a 
reinterpretation  of Lancaster (1979) proposed by Weitzman (1991). A. Rodrlguez-Clare /  Journal of Development Economics 49 (1996) 3-32  11 
4. Market equilibria 
Each firm producing a  variety of  x  is better off choosing a  variety that is  not 
already being produced by another firm; therefore, variety j  of x, if it is produced, 
is  produced  by  a  single  firm  which  then  chooses  the  price  p(j)  to  maximize 
profits.  Since  we  assume  free  entry  into  the  intermediate  goods  sector,  the 
equilibrium for this economy is defined as a measure of varieties produced (n),  an 
allocation  of  L  and  K  among the  production  of  z,  y  and  x  (L= +  Ly +  L~ =  L, 
K z +  K,. =  K-  n),  a  production  level  of  each  variety  of  x  and  its  allocation 
among sectors  (x(j)= xz(j) + x~.(j)),  a  rental  rate  for capital  (r),  a  wage  (w), 
and prices for each variety of x  (p(j)),  such that: (i) p(j) maximizes profits from 
producing variety j  of the intermediate good; (ii) given (n, r, w, { p(j); j  <  n}), the 
inputs  K,.,  L,-  and  {x,(j);  j  <  n}  are  determined  to  minimize  the  unit  cost  of 
producing final  good  s,  c~;  (iii)  if both  z  and  y  are produced,  then  c= =  P.  and 
cY = P.v, while if there is complete specialization in s, then c ~ =  p, and  c -~ =  P  ,, 
where  -z  =y  and  -y  =  z; and (iv) zero profits in the production of intermediate 
goods. 
To  analyze  the  equilibria  of this  economy we  will  first  characterize  a  quasi- 
equilibrium in which  n  is taken as given; this quasi-equilibrium will be referred to 
as an  n-equilibrium.  We will then complete the characterization of equilibrium by 
introducing  condition  (iv)  above.  This  condition  will  determine  levels  of  n  for 
which the  n-equilibrium  constitutes a general equilibrium. 
4.1.  n-equilibrium 
It is well known (see Helpman and Krugman,  1985, chapter 6) that in this type 
of model, each variety is going to be priced at a  constant markup (l/a)  over the 
marginal cost, which here is simply the wage: 
W 
p(j)=p*-  for  allj~[0,  n].  (3) 
O/ 
Given  that  all  varieties  are  priced  at  p*,  producers  of final  goods  will  use  all 
varieties available in the same quantity:  x(j) = x  for all  j. 
From (2) we can obtain the minimum unit cost of s as a function of n,  r, w and 
p  : 
cS(n,r,w,p*)=a(s)n  4~(")rS(S)wt~('~) s('~)(p*)'  ~{")  (4) 
where  a(s) =- 8(s)-~c~)(/3(s)  -  6(s)) -(¢(')- ~(~))(I -/3(s)) -II -m.~)). As  is  well 
known, the unit demand function for K,  L  or X  by sector s  can be obtained from 
(4) as  Oc~ =- Oc'(n, r, w, p* )/* h  for h =  r,  w  or p*.  Since the demand for X  is 12  A. Rodrfguez-Clare  / Journal of Development Economics 49 (1996) 3-32 
in  fact an  indirect  demand for labor,  producers  of final  good  s  will  use  (c;~ + 
c'p. )/c"  r  units of labor per unit of capital. Using (3) we can obtain that 
s 
(5) 
K,  Cr' 
where  y(s) -  [/3(s) -  6(s) + c~(1 -  ~(s))]/8(s).  Given  our  assumptions  that 
/3(z) >/3(y)  and  ~(y) >  6(z),  then  y(z) >  y(y),  which  implies  that  the  z 
sector's total use of labor (directly and indirectly through  X) per unit of capital is 
]8  higher than for sector y. 
Using (5), the labor market clearing condition entails 
y(z)(r}[  K,  [  r~[  gy  t 
Y(Y) t w) t K-~-  n  \  iv  /  ~ 
To examine the properties of the n-equilibrium, it is useful to derive the cost of 
z  relative to  y  when the economy is completely specialized in the production of 
final good  s  given  K  and  n,  which  we denote by ps(K, n).  To derive  Ps(K, n), 
first notice from (4) that 
cZ(n'r'w'w/c~)  =[a(z)))o~at3nae°(r)~'  (7) 
cY(n'r'w'w/c~)  I  a(y) 
where A6 =- ~(y) -  6(z) >  0 and  A~b -  (y) -  ~b(z) >  0. Complete specialization 
in final good  s entails  K s = K -  n, and plugging this into (6) yields (r/w) for the 
case in which there is complete specialization in final good  s. Plugging this into 
(7) finally yields 
z~6 
where  /x -  [a(z)/a(y)]ol  a¢. y(z) >  y(y) then  implies  pz(K, n) > py(K, n).  In 
words, the relative cost of the simple good  z is higher when there is specialization 
in  z  than  when  there  is  specialization in  y,  a  reflection of the concavity of the 
production possibilities frontier for a given level of n. 
Since  K  is fixed (for now), we will suppress the argument K  in  p,(K, n) when 
it does not lead to confusion. From (8) we can see that the curves  o,(n) have the 
shape of an inverted U  (see Fig.  1).  The reason for this  is  that,  as  n  increases, 
there are two opposite effects on  Ps- First,  an increase in  n  implies a decrease in 
the capital stock devoted to the production of final goods (K -  n  decreases).  As 
we know from neoclassical trade  theory,  this  leads  to  a  decrease  in  the  relative 
cost of the good that uses capital less intensively, that is, a decrease in  os(n).  This 
18  There  are  two reasons for this.  First,  3(y)>  6(z) implies that the  relative demand for (direct) 
labor is higher in the  z  sector than in the  y  sector. Second,  fl(z) >/3(y)  implies that the  z  sector uses 
more direct labor relative to the use of  X  (indirect labor) than the  y  sector. A. Rodrlguez-Clare / Journal of Development Economics 49 (1996) 3-32  13 
p  z(n) 
P 
n 
nz(p)  ny(p)  fi 
complete 
sp  specialization 
in y 
production of 
both z and y 
Fig.  1. 
is  the  'neoclassical'  effect.  Second,  because  of love of variety,  an  increase  in  n 
decreases  production costs  for both  final  goods.  Since  the  production  of  y  uses 
intermediate  goods  more  intensively  than  the  production  of  z  (as  reflected  in 
AO5 >  0),  the  cost  of production  for  y  decreases  relatively  more,  leading  to  an 
increase in  ps(n).  We refer to this effect as the  'love of variety' effect. For low n, 
a high quantity of capital is left for the production of final  goods and the love of 
variety effect dominates. Therefore, Ps(n) is upward sloping. For values of n close 
to  K, most of the capital stock is devoted to the production of intermediate goods 
and  there  is  little  left  for producing  final  goods.  Hence,  the  neoclassical  effect 
dominates  and  ps(n) slopes downward. 
Let  h,  be the  level of n  at which the curve p~.(n) attains  its  maximum.  From 
(8)  it  should  be  clear  that  hz=fi,. =fi--(Aqb/(Ach+A6))K.  Since  we  are 
interested  in  exploring  the  situation  in  which the  introduction  of the  division  of 
labor into the neoclassical  model affects the results  in a  significant way,  we will 
later on make the necessary assumption to ensure that the equilibrium  will always 
involve a level of n  smaller than  fi, so that we are in the region where the love of 
variety effect dominates  the  neoclassical  effect.  Therefore,  the  following discus- 
sion is restricted to levels of n  for which  n _< ~. 
For any level of n, the  n-equilibrium  may entail complete specialization in  z, 
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depending of course on the relative price of z, which we denote by p (p -  Pz/Pv). 
To see this formally, let  ns(p) denote the level of n  that satisfies  ps(n)=p  for 
n < fi  (see  Fig.  1).  We  then  have  the  following  characterization  of  the  n- 
equilibrium: 
1.  If n < nz(p), then  pz(n)<p  and there is complete specialization in  z. 
2.  If ny(p) < n < fi, then  p  < py(n) and there is complete specialization in  y. 
3.  If nz( p) < n < ny( p), then  pz(n) > p > py(n) and there is production of both 
z and  y. 
Fig.  1 illustrates these results. 
4.2.  General equilibria 
To characterize the general equilibria for this economy, we need to introduce 
the zero-profit condition in the production of intermediate goods. Denoting profits 
in the intermediate goods sector by 7r, we have 
7r=  [(w/a)  -  w] XIn -  r.  (9) 
X/n  is  the  quantity  sold  by  each  monopolist in  the  intermediate goods  sector, 
w/~  is the price charged, w is the unit cost and r  is the fixed cost (i.e. the cost of 
the one unit of capital required to produce a variety of x). 
From (4) we can obtain the demand for X  per unit of K  by sector s: 
s 
(10) 
K s  c~ 
where ~:(s) -  (1 -  fl(s))/8(s). Plugging this into (9) we obtain  (1o)  
7r=r  --  ~(Z)Kz+~(y)Ky)-r.  (11) 
n 
Let  n(s) be the value of  n  for which  7r = 0  if the economy were to specialize 
completely in final good  s  (K_ s = 0). From (11) and the capital market equilib- 
rium condition  K = n + K~ +  g y  we obtain 
n( s) = ~'( s) K  (12) 
where 
(1-  t~) ~(s) 
=  ' 
Since /3(z) >/3(y) and  6(y) >  3(z), then  ~(y) can be larger of smaller than 
~(z).  From (12)  this  implies  that  n(y)  could be  larger  or  smaller  than  n(z). 
Intuitively, when there is complete specialization in good y as opposed to good z, 
there are two opposing forces on profits in the intermediate good sector,  fl(z) > 
/3(y) implies that demand for X  by the  y  industry is higher than demand for X 
by the  z  industry and this tends to make profits higher when there is complete 
specialization in  y  than when there is complete specialization in  z.  3(y) >  ~(z) A. Rodr[guez-Clare  / Journal of Development Economics 49 (1996) 3-32  15 
implies that demand for capital by the y industry is higher than demand for capital 
by the  z  industry and this makes the rental rate for capital  -  and hence also the 
fixed cost of producing a variety of x -  higher when there is complete specializa- 
tion in good  y  than with complete specialization in good  z. Depending on which 
effect dominates,  n(y) could be larger or smaller than  n(z).  Since this paper is 
motivated by the  importance of the division of labor,  we assume  that the effect 
that arises through the difference /3(z)>/3(y) dominates. Formally, we assume 
that 
~(y) >  ~(z)  (I) 
This condition ensures that  n(y) >  n(z). Condition (I) also ensures that n(s) will 
be on the side of the curve p,(n) where the love of variety effect dominates the 
neoclassical effect; that is, n(s) < fi for s = z,y.  ~ 
The  fact  that  n(y)  is  higher  than  n(z)  leads  to  the  possibility  of multiple 
equilibria. Intuitively, if there is complete specialization in final good  y -  which 
uses  intermediate  goods  intensively  -  the  demand  for  intermediate  goods  is 
relatively high, leading to the production of a large variety of intermediate goods. 
But given that  y  uses intermediate goods more intensively than  z, this leads to a 
low relative cost of y, making complete specialization in  y a possible equilibrium. 
The opposite happens  when there is complete specialization in  z,  in which case 
there are few varieties of intermediate goods produced and the relative cost of y  is 
high, making complete specialization in  z a possible equilibrium. Notice from this 
discussion  that  we  need  n(y)-n(z)  to  be  large  for  there  to  exist  multiple 
equilibria. 
To see this formally, turn to Fig. 2, where we have assumed that n(y) -  n(z) is 
sufficiently large  that  p~(n(z)) < p~(n(y)).  If  p ~  [ p:(n(z)), p,,(n(y))],  as  we 
have in Fig. 2, then there are multiple equilibria. We can verify that all conditions 
tbr an  equilibrium are  satisfied at  the  n(z)-equilibrium:  since  p > p~(n(z)),  the 
n(z)-equilibrium involves complete specialization in  z and, given the definition of 
n(z), the zero-profit condition is satisfied. A  similar argument establishes that all 
conditions for an  equilibrium are satisfied at the  n(y)-equilibrium. ~0  ~t  As  one 
would  expect,  there  is  a  third  equilibrium,  with  n =  n*E [n:(p), ny(p)]  and 
19  Simple algebra shows that ~ >  n(y) if and only if /Ida > ada(y)A6. Condition (I) is equivalent to 
Ada>da(y)A6/6(y).  Given  that  c~,  6(y)<l,  then  da(y)Ar/6(y)>c~&(y)Ar,  so  condition  (I) 
implies ~> n(y). 
2o  Although the purpose of this paper is to show the possibility of multiple equilibria in a small-open 
economy, the results of this analysis do not depend on fixed relative prices. To see this, let tbe utility 
function of the representative consumer be U(z, y), assumed to be homothetic, and let  0,  be the rate of 
substitution in consumption of z  for y  when the quantity of good  s is zero (0. =  U~(0, 1)/UI(0, I) and 
O, = U2(I,O)/Uj(1,0)).  Then,  as  long  as  Pz(K, n(z)) < ~. < O: < p~,(K, n(y)),  both  the  complete 
specialization equilibria described above are general equilibria of this closed economy. 
-~  This result is not dependent on the assumption that  6(y)>  6(z):  when  6(y)_< 6(z) and I ArJ is 
small then pc(K, n)- py(K, n) will also be small and there will be multiple equilibria. 16  A. Rodrlguez-Clare  / Journal of Development Economics 49 (1996) 3-32 
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production of both  z and  y. 
It can be shown that profits in the intermediate goods sector are increasing in n 
at n =  n*  (see the appendix). This implies that with 'naive Marshallian dynamics', 
where entrepreneurs slowly enter the intermediate good sector if profits there are 
positive and slowly exit when they incur losses in that sector, the equilibrium with 
n  =  n*  is unstable:  starting at the equilibrium with  n  =  n  *,  a  slight perturbation in 
n  would take the economy to one of the equilibria with complete specialization. 
The following condition is sufficient (but not necessary) to ensure that pz(n(z)) 
<_ py(n( y)): 
a4,  D[1 + 
1 +  >  (II) 
A6  ,/(y) A~ 
where  A~=_ ,~( y) -  ~( z) > 0  and  D -  ~( y)y( z) -  ~( z)y( y) >  0. Just as condi- 
tion (I), condition (II) imposes an upper bound on  A6; it is trivially satisfied when 
zi6 =  0. Moreover, condition (II) also guarantees that for p  ~  [ Pz(n(z)),  py(n(y))] 
there  is  a  unique equilibrium,  which  entails  complete specialization in  z  when 
p  > py(n(y))  and complete specialization in  y  when  p  < pz(n(z)).  22 
22  When condition  (lI)  is not  satisfied there  are  several  possibilities.  If  1 +  Ath/A6 <  D[I +(1 - 
a)~(Z)]/y(z)21~ then there is a unique equilibrium for all prices. If D[I +(1 -  a)~(z)]/y(z)A~ < 1 
+  Aq~/A~ <  D[1 +(1 -  ct)~(y)]/y(y)A~, then there may be a  unique equilibrium or there may be 
multiple  equilibria.  Multiplicity  of equilibria  may involve  two  complete-specialization  equilibria  and 
one unstable (in the Marshallian sense) diversified equilibrium (i.e.,  with production of both  z  and  y) 
or it may involve one equilibrium with complete specialization in  z  and two diversified equilibria (one 
unstable and  one  stable  in the MarshaUian  sense).  See  Rodrlguez-Clare  (1995b)  for a  proof of these 
statements. A. Rodrlguez-Clare  /  Journal of Development Economics 49 (1996)  3-32  17 
The  following  proposition  which  is  proved  in  the  appendix,  summarizes  the 
main results  of this  section: 
Proposition  1.  Assume  conditions  (I) and (11) hold.  Then  pz(n(z)) < py(n( y)), 
and  there  is  a  unique  equilibrium  for  p  f~ [ pz(n(z)), py(n( y))]  and  multiple 
equilibria for p  E  [ pz(n( z)), py(n( y))].  In the latter case,  there are three equilib- 
ria:  an  equilibrium  with  n=n(z)  and  complete  specialization  in  z  (the  z 
equilibrium),  an equilibrium with n = n(y)  and complete specialization in y  (the 3' 
equilibrium),  and an equilibrium  with production  of both z  and y  (the diversified 
equilibrium).  The latter equilibrium is unstable under  'naiee Marshallian'  dynam- 
ics. 
We can  now consider how the endowment of  K  and  L  affects  whether  there 
are  multiple  equilibria.  From  (8)  and  Proposition  1  we  can  see  that  there  is 
multiple equilibria if and only if 
[  py( K,n( y))] = ['e(z)  q'(z) K  ] 
(13) 
where ~(s)  =  #y(s)a6T(s)'a4'(1  -  7"(s)) as and k = K/L  (note that we are reintro- 
ducing  K  as a variable in the  Ps0 function).  This condition implies that there are 
multiple equilibria only for 'intermediate'  economies; for very low levels of K  or 
k  there  is  a  unique equilibrium,  which entails  complete specialization in good  z, 
while  for  high  levels  of  K  or  k  there  is  a  unique  equilibrium,  which  entails 
complete specialization in  y. 
To understand  better the conditions  under which there  are  multiple  equilibria, 
we need  to consider how  p  is  determined.  Assume  that  the  rest  of the  world  is 
composed of a continuum of countries, all of which have an economy as described 
above with conditions (I) and (II) satisfied. Moreover, assume all countries (except 
the  one  we  are  considering)  have  an  identical  endowment  of capital  and  labor, 
which we denote by K w and  L w (with  k w =- Kw/Lw), respectively. Then, if both  z 
and  y  are essential  in consumption (i.e.,  their  marginal utility  goes to infinity as 
their consumption goes to zero), necessarily the world price  p  must satisfy: 
".t'~W  "W  ,  "~W  "~W  (14) 
This implies that our small economy will exhibit multiple equilibria if and only if 
it is similar to the rest of the world in terms of size (K) and the capital-labor ratio 
(k);  that is,  if and only if  K  and  k  are not too different from  K w  and  k 
This  completes  the characterization  of equilibria  for this  model.  The next two 
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5. Welfare analysis 
In  the  previous  section  we  concluded  that  under  some  conditions  there  are 
multiple  equilibria.  A  natural  question  arises:  can the equilibria be Pareto ranked 
and if so, which one is  Pareto superior? Given that the diversified equilibrium  is 
unstable,  we  will  restrict  the  welfare  comparison  to  the  two  equilibria  with 
complete specialization. To do so, we first compare the wage and the rate of return 
to capital across the  z  and  y  equilibria. 
There are three different effects on the wage and the rate of return to capital as 
the  economy switches  from the  z  equilibrium  to the  y  equilibrium.  First,  since 
n(y) >  n(z), there is a variety effect that tends to make both w  and  r  higher in the 
y  equilibrium  than  in  the  z  equilibrium.  Second,  n(y)> n(z)  implies  that  the 
quantity  of capital  left to produce final  goods (K-  n) is  lower in the  y  equilib- 
rium  than  in  the  z  equilibrium,  and  this  tends  to  make  w/r  lower  in  the  y 
equilibrium.  Third,  the  y  sector  is  more  capital  intensive  than  the  z  sector (as 
reflected in 3'(z) >  T(y)), and this also leads to a lower w/r  in the  y equilibrium 
than in the  z  equilibrium.  Letting  r(n) and w(n) denote the levels of r  and  w  in 
the  n-equilibrium,  these  three  effects  imply  that  r(n(y))> r(n(z)).  This  is  not 
necessarily  the  case  with  w,  however,  since  the  second and  third  effects  tend  to 
make  w(n(y))  lower  than  w(n(z)). 23  But  it  can  be  shown  that  when  a  is 
sufficiently low,  so that the  variety effect is  sufficiently  strong,  then  w(n(y))> 
w(n(z)),  so the  y  equilibrium  Pareto-dominates  the  z  equilibrium.  We state  this 
result formally in the following proposition,  which is proved in the appendix. 
Proposition  2.  Assume  conditions  (I)  and  (II)  hold.  (i)  r  is  higher  in  the  y 
equilibrium  than  in  the z  equilibrium.  (ii)  For any p  there  exists  a  level  of ce, 
a *  (p), such that if a  < ce *  (p) then the wage is higher in the y equilibrium than 
in  the  z  equilibrium.  (iii)  As  a  consequence  of  (i)  and  (ii),  if  p 
[ pz(n( z)), py(n( y))]  and  ce < a *( p),  both  the rate of return  to capital and the 
wage  are  higher  in  the  y  equilibrium  than  in  the  z  equilibrium.  Hence,  the  y 
equilibrium Pareto-dominates the z equilibrium. 
This  proposition  implies  that  when  there  are  multiple  equilibria  and  love  of 
variety  is  sufficiently  strong,  if  the  economy  is  at  the  z-equilibrium  there  is 
another equilibrium in which everyone would be better off. There is a coordination 
failure: everyone would be better off in the equilibrium with complete specializa- 
tion in  y  but no single  individual  wants to produce  y  given the  small  variety of 
specialized  inputs  available;  since  the  production  of  y  uses  specialized  inputs 
intensively, it is not profitable to produce y  when  n  is low. But it is not profitable 
23  As an example, for parameters ~(y)= 6(z)=0.7,  /3(z)= 0.89, fl(y)=0.8,  o~ = 0.8 and the 
highest level of p for which there is a y equilibrium we obtain w(n(y))/w(n(z))= 0.95. A. Rodr[guez-Clare  / Journal of DeL'elopment Economics 49 (1996) 3-32  19 
for anyone to produce  a  new  variety of the  intermediate good because since the 
economy is completely specialized in the production of z, and  z  uses intermediate 
goods with relatively low  intensity, there  is insufficient demand for intermediate 
goods. 24 
When  love of variety is not strong enough,  so that  w(n(y))  < w(n(z)),  the  y 
equilibrium may  still Pareto dominate the  z  equilibrium if workers own  enough 
capital. And even if they do not own any capital, the  y  equilibrium may dominate 
the  z  equilibrium according  to  the  potential-Pareto criterion.  This  would  be  the 
case if the value of domestic production is higher at the  y  equilibrium than at the 
z  equilibrium. The following proposition, which is proved in the appendix, shows 
that this is always the case: 
Proposition  3.  The y  equilibrium  dominates  the  z  equilibrium  according  to  the 
potential-Pareto  criterion. 
If  the  price  of  good  z  increases  sufficiently,  p  will  become  higher  than 
py(n(y)).  At that point,  the international price of  z  is  so favorable that the only 
equilibrium involves complete specialization in  z. 25  But  (by continuity) if  p  is 
not  that  much  higher  than  py(n(y)),  the  value  of  production  is  higher  when 
n =  n(y) and there is complete specialization in  y  than at the  z  equilibrium. This 
establishes a result that is similar to the  Dutch Disease  in that the high price of the 
simple good  z  prevents the economy from allocating resources to the production 
of  good  y,  an  allocation  that  dominates  the  z  equilibrium  according  to  the 
potential-Pareto criterion. 
Starting from a  situation in which there are multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria 
and the economy is located at the  z  equilibrium, an  increase in the capital stock 
could  take  the  economy  out  of the  bad  equilibrium.  But  given  that  the  rate  of 
return  to  capital  is  relatively  low  at  the  z  equilibrium,  allowing  for  capital 
accumulation does not necessarily lead to an increase in the capital stock that can 
solve this problem. Moreover, because of the low return to capital, capital will not 
necessarily flow  from  capital-abundant countries.  We  show  this  formally in  the 
next section. 
24  A  sufficiently high tariff on  good  y  would rule out the  z  equilibrium, thereby leading the 
economy towards the y equilibrium. Still, closing the economy to international trade is not necessarily 
optimal when the economy is at the bad equilibrium. The condition for autarky to be better than trade 
with specialization in good  z is that the relative price of z in autarky is higher than the international 
relative price of z (see Ethier, 1982b). 
25  In a similar model, Markusen (1990) explores whether an equilibrium with production of y exists. 
basically by endogenizing the relative price ~  P,.. He does not explore the multiple equilibria result of 
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6. Why doesn't capital flow from rich to poor countries 
As has been noted by many authors (e.g.  Lucas,  1990; Romer,  1991; Stiglitz, 
1988),  the  Solow  model  leads  to  very  large  differences  in  the  rate  of return  to 
capital across rich and poor countries.  For instance, Lucas (1990) estimates that if 
the difference in income per capita between  India and  the United States  is  to be 
explained by differences in capital-labor ratios, the marginal product of capital in 
India would be about 58 times the marginal product of capital in the United States. 
Without  negating  the  importance  of  imperfections  in  the  international  capital 
market, this calculation suggests that it is important to construct a theory that can 
explain differences in income per capita across countries without generating these 
large differences in rates of return to capital. 
As  is  well  known,  this  can  be  done  by  introducing  human  capital  into  the 
neoclassical model. If both human and physical capital are scarce relative to labor 
in  one  country,  the  rate  of return  to  physical  capital  can  be  equal  to  that  in  a 
country where there is abundance of both kinds of capital.  This approach leads to 
another problem, however, since it implies that the rate of return to human capital 
in  developing  countries  is  higher  than  in  developed  countries,  contradicting  the 
impression  that  in  many  underdeveloped  countries  there  is  unemployment  of 
skilled workers, or skilled workers are engaged in unskilled tasks (Stiglitz,  1988). 
This  approach  is  also inconsistent  with  the  fact that  the relative  wage of skilled 
versus unskilled workers in low-income countries is not significantly different than 
in industrialized countries (Jain,  1991).  26 
These  problems  do  not  arise  if we  allow  human  capital  to  generate  positive 
aggregate externalities,  as  shown  in  Lucas  (1990).  In this  section  we  will  show 
that our model can generate this result without the need to postulate the existence 
of aggregate technological externalities. 
Suppose  we  have  two  small,  open  economies,  A  and  B,  which  are  identical 
except for the fact that economy A  is in the  y  equilibrium while economy B  is in 
the  z  equilibrium.  Proposition 2 implies that the rate of return to capital is higher 
in A  than  in B.  With free capital  mobility, this  would generate a  flow of capital 
from economy B  to economy A,  and  this  could lead  to a  situation  in  which the 
capital-labor ratio and the wage level are higher in A  than in B and yet the rate of 
return to capital is equalized across the two economies. 
To see this  formally, first notice that,  because of the love of variety effect, the 
rate of return to capital is not necessarily decreasing in  K. But for there to exist a 
stable allocation of capital across A  and B  we need the rate of return to capital to 
26  The  implication of the  neoclassical model with human capital is  also inconsistent with the 
impression that there are pressures for migration of skilled workers from underdeveloped to developed 
economies (see Romer, 1991). Of course, this would not arise if there were differences in taxes or 
technology across countries, but  the  point is  that human capital by  itself  cannot reconcile the 
neoclassical growth model with the data. A. Rodrfguez-Clare  / Journal of Development Economics 49 (1996) 3-32  21 
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be  decreasing  in  K.  Let  rs(K, n)  be  the  rate  of return  to capital  when  there  is 
complete specialization in final good s  as a function of n  and the capital stock  K, 
and (with a  slight abuse of notation) let  rs( K) =- r,( K, r(s)K) represent the rate 
of return  to capital  at  an equilibrium  with complete specialization  in  s.  r~(K) is 
decreasing  as  long  as  love  of variety  is  not  too  strong  compared  to  the  rate  at 
which  the  marginal  product  of  capital  would  decrease  in  a  pure  neoclassical 
setting;  formally,  r's(K) <  0  if and  only if  ~b(s) <  1 -  6(s).  Since  ~(y) >  qS(z) 
and  6(y) > 6(z) then the condition 
4)(Y)  >  1 -  6(y)  (III) 
is sufficient to guarantee  ~b(s) <  1 -  6(s) for both  s =  z  and  s =  y. In the rest of 
this  section we assume that condition (III) is  satisfied,  so both  r:(K)  and  ry(K) 
are decreasing in  K  (see Fig.  3). 
Let ws(K) be the wage in the  s equilibrium as a function of K. The following 
proposition, which is proved in the appendix,  states the main result of this section: 
Proposition  4.  Assume  conditions  (I),  (II)  and  (III)  hold  and  let there  be  two 
economies, A  and B  with a  total capital stock K v ~  [ Kmi,, K .... ] which can flow 
freely between A  and B  (Kmi n and Kma  x are defined in the appendix).  There is an 
equilibrium in which economy A  is in the y equilibrium with capital stock K A and 
economy  B  is  in  the  z  equilibrium  with  capital  stock  K B = K T -K  a,  with 
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This  proposition implies  that  an  economy in  the  y  equilibrium  with  K =  K  A 
has  a  higher wage than  an  economy in  the  z  equilibrium  with  K = K B,  but the 
rate  of  return  is  equal  across  these  two  economies.  Therefore  the  model  can 
account for differences in wages across economies without generating the implica- 
tion that capital should flow from the economy with higher wages to the economy 
27  with lower wages. 
We can also use Fig. 3 to gain some intuition about what may happen once we 
allow for capital accumulation in this economy. If there are no international capital 
flows, as  in  the  standard closed-economy neoclassical model,  then there may be 
two steady state  levels of  K.  For instance,  with a  time-separable utility function 
and an instantaneous intertemporal discount rate  ~o, then if  ~0 = rz(K B) = ry(K  A ) 
(as in Fig. 3) there is a steady state with  K = K B, specialization in final good z, a 
shallow division of labor and low wages, and another steady state with  K =  K A, 
specialization  in  final  good  y,  a  deep  division  of labor  and  high  wages.  This 
suggests  the  existence  of multiple  equilibrium  paths  of capital  accumulation for 
certain initial  conditions.  In the working paper version of this  paper (Rodrfguez- 
Clare,  1995b) I develop a dynamic version of the model presented here to derive 
these results formally. 
7. Conclusion 
This  paper has developed a  model that incorporates three basic premises into 
the neoclassical model of a  small, open economy: that efficiency is enhanced by 
the division of labor,  that there are specialized inputs for which the proximity of 
suppliers  and  users  is  essential  and  that  the  division  of labor is  limited  by the 
extent of the market. The main implication of the model is that an economy may 
be  stuck in  an equilibrium  with a  shallow division of labor and specialization in 
labor intensive goods, where both the wage and the rate of return to capital are low 
27  When condition (III) is not satisfied,  the model may lead  to the  same kind of destabilizing  forces 
noted by Kaldor (1970) and Faini (1984).  To see this, assume that &(z) >  1 -  ~(z), which also implies 
q~(y) > 1 -  6(y). This implies that  rz(K) are both increasing in  K. Therefore, there is an equilibrium 
capital  allocation  such that all  capital  ends up in  one economy, say economy A.  This is an extreme 
result.  In  the  equilibrium where all  the  capital  stock ends up  in economy A,  economy B  produces 
nothing; the labor force in economy B  is completely idle.  The reason for this is  that the  absence of 
capital  implies also that there  will be no intermediate  goods produced.  Since  in the  Cobb-Douglas 
specification of the technology each input is essential,  the lack  of intermediate  goods implies that the 
return to capital  is zero, even when wages are zero.  This extreme result is of course a consequence of 
the simplicity  of the model. It would not hold in a more realistic  model where, for instance,  there  is a 
sector where non-tradable intermediate  goods are not essential or where such intermediate  goods can be 
produced  with  labor  alone.  Similarly,  this  extreme  result  would  not  hold  if  we  allow  for  some 
intermediate  goods to be tradable  internationally. A. Rodrfguez-Clare / Journal of Development Economics 49 (1996) 3-32  23 
and, as a consequence, there are no capital inflows or domestic capital accumula- 
tion.  Thus,  the  model  gives one possible explanation  for why  some underdevel- 
oped countries fail to grow as fast as the simple neoclassical model suggests. 
One  criticism  of  the  model  is  that  with  the  advance  of  communications 
technology and the decrease of transportation costs in the last decades, it may now 
be  possible  to  trade  most  inputs,  and  even  many  services,  on  an  international 
scale. 28  This would obviously eliminate the multiple Pareto-rankable equilibrium 
result.  However,  since  transportation  costs  for final  goods  have  also  decreased, 
which  by  itself  could  lead  to  more  economic  agglomeration  (as  shown  by 
Krugman (1991)),  the effects of lower transportation costs may be ambiguous. 
An essential assumption in this paper is that a firm cannot use cheap labor from 
the  poor economy and simultaneously benefit from the abundance of specialized 
inputs available in the rich economy; this is the assumption that allows wages to 
differ across countries without generating capital flows that would restore equality 
in the wage level. It seems sensible, however, that by becoming multinational,  or 
through international  subcontracting, a firm could benefit from the cheap labor in 
the poor economy and the abundance of specialized inputs in the rich economy. In 
fact, this  seems to be prevalent around the World.  For instance,  many American 
manufacturers  of  semiconductors  have  located  assembly  plants  in  countries  of 
South-East Asia, where there is an abundant and well educated labor force. Textile 
'maquiladoras'  all  around  the  world  are  another  good  example  of  this  phe- 
nomenon. Even within the United States it is well documented that many firms, as 
they  become  mature,  transplant  the  simpler,  more  labor  intensive  part  of their 
production  process  to  low-wage-low-density  regions  while  maintaining  their 
headquarters  in  centers  of industrial  concentration  such  as  Silicon  Valley.  The 
question  is  whether  this  phenomenon  weakens  the  results  derived  in  this  paper. 
Elsewhere (Rodrlguez-Clare,  1995a) I have developed a similar model to the one 
presented  in  this  paper  but  allowing  for  the  formation  of  multinationals.  It  is 
shown there that the multiple Pareto-rankable equilibrium property still holds, and 
more importantly, that multinationals may have positive or negative effects on the 
host economy, depending on the characteristics of their home country and the type 
of good they produce. 
28  For those who find it hard to believe that proximity of suppliers and users of inputs is important, 1 
suggest reading an article in the New York Times (8-4-1994), page A1) which reported how firms were 
coming back to New York because of the importance of having suppliers and customers close by. The 
article reports that when Mr.  Volchik moved his knitwear company to New Jersey he lound that his 
company "was  losing touch with the tight network of garment makers, suppliers and customers in 
Queens and Brooklyn that helped him survive. Parts to  repair his complex computer-driven knitting 
machines took days to arrive rather than hours. Sweater designers in Manhattan found the trek more 
burdensome and placed orders elsewhere. Special types of yarn were harder to come by". 24  A. Rodrfguez-Clare  / Journal of Development Economics 49 (1996) 3-32 
8. For further reading 
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Appendix  A 
A.1.  Proof of Proposition  1 
We must  first derive a  precise formula for profits in  the  intermediate goods 
sector when  both  z  and  y  are  produced.  In  this  case,  we  must  have  equality 
between relative cost and relative price, which from (7) implies 
a(z)  t  /  r  \-AS 
t~ =  a--(--~  ] c~ at~nar [ -~ )  .  (A.1) 
From this equation we obtain  r/w  as a function of n: 
r/w = ( tz/p)'/a~N a  (A.2) 
where  A = aq~/a3 and  /z -= (a(z)/a(y))~ al3. Plugging (A.2) into (6) and using 
the condition K = n + K z +  Ky  we obtain: 
L-  y( y)( tx/p)'/a'na(  K-  n) 
K z =  (A.3) 
AT( i~/p)l/aSn a 
and 
y( Z)( tx/p)l/aSna(  K-  n) -  L 
Ky =  (A.4) 
Ay( tz/p)l/a~n a A. Rodrfguez-Clare / Journal of De~'elopment Economics 49 (1996) 3-32  25 
where  d T -  Y(z) -  T(Y) >  0. Plugging (A.3) and (A.4) into the expression for/z 
in Eq.  (11) yields 
1  -  a  AbeL 
(A.5) 
Differentiating  (A.5) with respect to  n  we obtain 
0,  -  a-Tp;-  (1.6) 
Let  no(p)  be  defined  implicitly  by  O(~/r)/On =  0.  Eq.  (A.6)  implies  that 
O(Tr/r)/On >  0  for  n  < no(p)  and  O(w/r)/On <  0  for  n < no(p).  Define  ~  as 
the  maximum  level  of  p  for  which  there  is  an  equilibrium  with  complete 
specialization  in  y; formally,  ~  is defined implicitly by  ny(~) =  n(y).  Condition 
(II) implies that  no(~) >  ny(p).  To see this, note from (A.6) that 
.o(?)  ,, =  A L(I  + A) 
DK(/.t/~) 1/a~" 
From  n,,(~) = n(y) and (8) we obtain 
L 
n'(P)  ~' =  ( It/~)~/a~KT(y)(1  -  7(y)) 
From these two equations  we immediately see that  n0(~) >  ny(.~) is equivalent to 
condition  (II). Now,  n0(~) >  ny(fi) implies that for p  = ~,  ~r/r is increasing  for 
all  n  ~  [n:(~), ny(.~)].  We  now  use this  fact to prove the different  statements  of 
the proposition. 
We  first  check  that  condition  (II)  implies  pz(n(z))< py(n(y)).  Assume  that 
condition  (II)  holds  but  pz(n(z))>py(n(y)).  We  will  derive  a  contradiction. 
Assume  p  =~.  Then  ~-=0  for  n =  n(y)=ny(p)and  7r/r  is  increasing  for  all 
n ~  [n=(,~), nv(~)].  But  since  p~(n(z)) > py(n(y))  then  necessarily  7r> 0  at 
n =  n~(~)  (this  follows  from  the  fact  that  n(z)> n~(fi)  and  the  fact  that  ~-  is 
decreasing  in  n  when  there  is  complete  specialization).  Therefore,  we  have  that 
7r/r is positive at n~(p), increasing for all  n ~  [n=(~), n,.(fi)] and zero at  n~.(~), 
a  contradiction. 
We  now  check  that  there  is  a  unique  equilibrium  when  p 
[ p=(n(z)), py(n(y))].  There  are  two  cases.  (i)  If  p  < p~(n(z)) then  there  is  an 
equilibrium  with  complete  specialization  in  y  but  no  equilibrium  with  complete 
specialization  in  z.  There  cannot  exist  an  equilibrium  with  diversification  given 
the  shape of the  profit function.  (ii) If p  >  py(n(y))  then  there  is an equilibrium 
with complete specialization  in  z  but no equilibrium  with complete specialization 
in  y.  Condition  (II) implies  that there  is  no  diversified  equilibrium.  To see  this, 
notice that  ~-< 0  for n =  nz(~) and  ~-= 0  for n =  ny(~);  therefore,  since Tr/r is 
increasing  in  n  for  n ~  [nz(~), ny(/3)]  necessarily  ~<  0  for  n E  [nz(~) , ns(fi) ]. 26  A. Rodrfguez-Clare  / Journal  of Development  Economics  49 (1996)  3-32 
Since 7r  is weakly decreasing in  p  for n ~  [nz(p), ny(p)]  then for any p  > ~  we 
have ~-< 0 for all  n ~  [nz(p), ny(p)]. 
Finally,  when  p~[pz(n(z)),  py(n(y))]  then  there  is  an  equilibrium  with 
complete specialization in  z, and an equilibrium with complete specialization in  y. 
This implies that  7r/r <  0  for  n = nz(p)  and  7r/r> 0  for  n = ny(p),  and given 
the  shape of the function  7r/r  derived above, this implies there can be only one 
diversified equilibrium.  Moreover,  in  this  case necessarily we have  7r'(n*)> 0. 
Q.E.D. 
A.2.  Proof of Proposition 2 
Let  ws(n, K)  represent  the  wage  when  there  is  complete specialization  in  s, 
given  n  and  K. From (2) we can derive 
w,( n, K)  = p~nt(~)( K-  n) ~(')([3(s) -  6( s) ) Ls  ~(s)- ~(')- I xs}-fl(s). 
(A.7) 
But 
x, 
L,  c;  (A.8) 
Using  L s + X s = L  we can obtain from (A.8) that 
L s = (fl(s)  -  6(s))L/[J(s)y(s).  (A.9) 
Plugging (A.8) and (A.9) into (A.7) we obtain 
w,( n, K) =  B,y(s) nt(S)L- ~(s)( K -  n) ~(~)  (A.10) 
where  B; = Psal-~(s)y(s)~(s)-l/a(s).  We  will  drop  the  argument  K  from the 
function w~(n, K) in the rest of this proof. 
We need to show that, for any p, Wy(n(y))/Wz(n(z))  grows without bound as a 
approaches zero. We can express Wy(n(y))/Wz(n(z))  as 
Wy(n(y)) =(Wy(n(y),  )(Wy(n)y)po)))(Wz(ny(Po,))  (m.ll) 
Wz(n(z))  Wy(ny(Po))  Wz(ny)Po))  Wz(n)z)) 
for any P0. From (A.10) we obtain 
a8  Wy(ny(po)  )  (By'y(y))  (K-ny(Po, ) 
Wz(ny(Po) )  --  Bz'y(Z )  nA6  L 
and using (8) we get 
8(z) 
Wy( ny( Po)  = Po  l~- ty( y)  = 
Wz(ny(Po)  nzT (Z)  T(Z) ] A. Rodrlguez-Clare  / Journal of Development  Economics  49 (1996) 3-32  27 
Setting P0 = .o (defined above) gives ny(Po) = n(y). Then from (A.11) we obtain 
Wz(n(Y))  _  (T(Y)  1 ~(z)  Wz(n(Y)) 
2mowXn(z)   tT( f  2im°wXn(z l " 
From (12) and (A.10) we get 
wz(n(y))  (1-~-(y)) 
wz(n(z))  1  T(z) 
a(z)( r(y)  ] +(z) 
Because of condition (I), this term tends ~  to as  a  --* 0.  Q.E.D. 
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3 
Let  Ws(n) and  r,(n)  be  the  wage  and  the  rental  rate  of capital  when  the 
economy is  completely specialized  in  final  good  s  as  functions of  n,  and  let 
Ts(n = ws(n)L + rs(n)K.  Since  there  are  zero  profits  both  at  the  z  and  y 
equilibria,  then the total value of production at the  s  equilibrium is  necessarily 
T,(n(s)).  Therefore, all we have to do is to prove that Ty(n(y)) > Tz(n(z)).  To do 
so, we first prove Claim 1: 
Claim 1.  T'(n) > 0 for all n, for s = z,y. 
Proof  A similar procedure to the one we followed to get (A.10) yields 
rs(n) = B  s n4~(S)L  1  - ~(s)( K -  n)~(s)-i  (A. 12) 
Eqs. (A. 10) and (A.12) imply 
Ts(n ) =Bsn6(S)L'  ~(S)(K-n)8(')(T(s ) +K/(K-n)).  (A.I3) 
From (A.13)  we  obtain (we  momentarily drop  the  index  for  s  to  simplify the 
notation): 
T'(n)  =BLI-'~[~)n~-I(K-n)8(TWK/(K-n)) 
-6n4~( K-n)a-l(T+  K/( K-n))  +n6( K-n)a-2K] 
= BLl-~n6-1( K-  n) ~-t[ qb( K-  n)( y + K/( K-  n) ) 
-~n(T+ K/( K-n))  +nK/( K-n)] 
= BL'-Sn6-'(K- n) ~-'[q~T(K- n) 
+ 6K-  ¢Syn + (1 -  6 )nK/( K-  n)]. 
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y6= fl- 6+ a(1- fl)=  -ach+ (1- 6),  so  -6yn=  ac~n-(1-  6)n.  But 
Plugging this  into (A.14)  and rearranging yields 
r'(n) = 8L'- n  '(X- 
[~bTK-n)  +  ~bK+ c~n  +(1  -  6)n2(K -  n)-']  >  0 
which proves Claim  1. 
Claim 2.  Let m be defined implicitly by py(m) = p. Then Ty(m) > Tz(m). 
Proof  From (8) we see that  py(m) =p  implies 
p = Qy( y) a~mAC~( ~-m-- ) ~  (1.15) 
Using (A.13)  and (1.15)  we obtain 
Ty(m)  as(y(y)  i~(z~-'(y(y)+K/(K-m)) 
Tz(m )  a-  ~ y(z)  }  T(z)+K/(K-m)  "  (1.16) 
Given  a -a~ >  1 (since  ce <  1), then all that remains to show is that 
7( y)8(z)-l[ y( y) + K/( K_ m)]  > T( z)~(z)-l[ g( z) + K/( K- m)]. 
(A.17) 
To show that this inequality holds, let  g(x, m) -  x ~(z)-l[ x + K/(K -  m)]. (A. 17) 
is equivalent to  g(T(Y), m) > g(T(z), m), which it turn is equivalent to 
f4~, <  (z~ Og( x, m) 
(Y)  Ox  dx <  0.  (A.18) 
We will  now  show that  Og(x, m)/Ox <  0  for all (x,m)  with  x < g(z),  which  is 
obviously sufficient to prove (A.18).  From (A.17)  we get 
Og( x,m) /Ox  =x~(Z)-2[ ( 6( z) -1)( x + K/( K-n) ) +x] 
=xa(Z)_2[6(z)x_(l_6(z))K/(K_n))]  "  (A.19) 
We can see from (A.19) that 32g/OxOm  <  0, so Og(x, m)/Ox < Og(x,O)/Ox for 
all  m. But from (A.19)  we obtain 
Og( x,O)/Ox= 6( z)x-  (1 -  6( z) ).  (A.20) 
From the definition of y(s) we get  8(z)y(z)  =  fl(z) -  8(z) +  a(1  -  fl(z)),  and 
plugging this  into (A.20)  yields 
Og(y(z),O)/Ox=  -(1  -  a)(1  -  fl(z))  <  0.  (A.21) 
From  (A.20)  we  see  that  Og(x,O)/Ox  is  increasing  in  x,  so  (A.21)  implies 
Og(x,O)/Ox <  0  for all  x <  y(z).  This ends  the proof of Claim 2. A. Rodrlguez-Clare  / Journal of Development Economics 49 (1996) 3-32  29 
When there are multiple equilibria,  necessarily  n(z) <  m <  n(y),  so 
T(n(y))-T(n(z))  =  (z)T,'(n)dn+(T~(m)-T:(m)) 
n(y)  , 
r(.(nldn.  (A.22) 
Given  Claims  1  and  2,  we  can  conclude  from  (A.22)  that  T(n(y))>  T(n(z)). 
Q.E.D. 
A.4.  Proof of Proposition 4 
where 
We  first  define  Kmi n  and  Kma  x.  There  are  multiple  equilibria  if and  only  if 
K~  [K 1, K2],  where  Kt  and  K 2  are  defined  implicitly  by  p:(K~,r(z)K~)=p 
and  py(K 2 , ~-(y) K 2) =  p, respectively. An equilibrium allocation of capital across 
economies A  and B  involves levels of  K A,  K B with  K A >  K~  and  K B <  K 2 such 
that  G(K A) =  r~(KB).  Now, if the total capital stock is too low or too high,  there 
does  not exist  an  allocation  of capital  that equalizes  the  rate  of return  to  capital 
across the two economies.  Let  K 0  be defined implicitly by  r:(K o) = ry(K,)  and 
let  K 3  be  defined  implicitly  by  ry(K 3) =  r~(K z)  (see  Fig.  3).  When  the  total 
capital  stock  K T  is  such  that  K T <  gmi  n ~  K 0 +  K I  or  K T >  Km~  x -= K 2 +  K3, 
there  is  no  allocation  of capital  such  that  the  rate  of return  to  capital  is  equal 
across economies A  and B. 
With a slight abuse of notation, let  w,,(K) =  ws(n(s), K). From (12) and (A.12) 
we obtain: 
r,.(K)  =  B0-(s)rCO(1  -  "r(s))~O)-'Kr(S)+~(~;)-'L '-~(s),  (A.23) 
w,(K)  =B~y(s)~'(s)6(S)(l  -  "r(s))6(~)Kr(S)+~¢~)L  ~(~)  (A.24) 
The condition  ry(K  A) =  r:(K B) implies 
KAO~y)+a(y)-J  ) 
Ks,(z)+a(:)_ j  L  as=  1  (A.25) 
By~-(y)6(Y)(1  -  ,r(y)) ~(y)  ' 
J= 
BzT(z)6(z)(1  -- ~-(Z)) ~(z)-'  • 
From (A.25)  we obtain an implicit function  KB(KA), from which we get 
wz(n(z))  ' KB(KA) )  =  EL  a~/'TK(Aa4"+a~)/"  (A.26) 30  A. Rodrlguez-Clare  / Journal  of Development  Economics  49 (1996) 3-32 
where 
rt=l-~b(z)-B(z)  and  E=t-~--~](~  ). 
The  fact  that  Ry(KA, n(y))>p  (necessary  for there  to  exist  an  equilibrium  with 
complete specialization in  y  in country A) implies a  lower bound  on  KA: 
KaY+ a'py(y)-a~r(  y)-  ~'~(1  -  ~-(y)) -a~LAS. 
Using  this  inequality,  we  obtain  from  (A.26)  that  Wy(n(y), KA)> 
Wz(n(z), KB(KA))  if and only if 
JEnl  x- 'Y(Y) -aa.(y)  A~,(1 _  ~.(y)) -a~ >  1.  (A.27) 
Plugging in for  J,  E  and  /x into the LHS  of this inequality we can rewrite (A.27) 
as 
T-~]  t r---~]  t  1  ~-(y)  >  1 
which  is true given that  a  <  1,  y(z)  >  y(y)  and  1 >  7(y)>  ~'(z).  Q.E.D. 
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